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CASE COMMENTS
BHARAT FORGE, HUMPTY DUMPTY AND THE
EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES
Shyam Divan

*

In the Spring of 1995 Justice Hansaria of the Supreme Court put a final polish
to his opinion in the Bharat Forge! case. Both his colleagues on the bench, Justice
Kuldip Singh, the senior most puisne judge of the court and the more recently
appointed Justice Majumdar, had approved the ingenuity of Justice Hansaria's
approach. An approach scarcely hinted at during arguments at the Bar, but invented,
researched and developed by the Justice himself.
The Bharat Forge case will probably earn a passage or two in commentaries
on statutory interpretation and emerge as a footnote in text books dealing with the
municipal tax, octroi. However, the real significance of this judgment is not in what
the court decides but in the wisdom it discards. For the judgment strays far from what
many of us took to be rooted in our Constitution and fundamental to the business
of our superior courts: The rule of law; the binding force of precedent; the
constitutional mandate that no person may be taxed except with the authority of law;
and the principle that in our republic the highest courts aid the citizen by upholding
fundamental rights against state action and would never turn Art. 21 against a person
to impose a tax.
Many courts will lean towards the treasury in a dispute over taxes: Judges are
known to exercise their discretion in favour of government when the scales are
evenly poised. Were this the route travelled by the Bharat Forge court, there would
be no cause for alarm. But when a court grasps at an arcane, never-before-applied
doctrine of Scots law - a doctrine so obscure that it is all but buried in Scotland itself
- to saddle an Indian tax payer with a huge tax liability, there is reason for serious
concern. One might well ask: In the wake of Bharat Forge, how secure is the Indian
citizen from an illegal impost? If a Scots law doctrine can be so readily imported
- without pleading or oral argument2 - to prop an otherwise illegal levy, can relief
*

Advocate, High Court, Bombay. The author thanks Gautam Patel of the Bombay High Court Bar
for his insights and valuable critique of a draft of this article.

Municipal Corporation for City of Pune v. Blwrat Forge Co. Ltd., (1995) 3 SCC 434. This
judgment was followed by a short order dated 3rd May, 1995 dismissing
by Bharat Forge. Infra n. 15.
2

the review petition filed

Poona Municipal Corporation (PMC) relied on the Scots law doctrine of 'desuetude' for the first
time in its written submissions filed after the hearing concluded. 'Desuetude' was not mentioned
in any pleadings before the High Court or in the appeals filed before the Supreme Court. The
doctrine was not urged in oral arguments at the Bar of the Supreme Court although the term was
mentioned in passing.
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ever be obtained from the courts? The Bharat Forge judgment deserves a hard look
because it tears the fabric of settled tax jurisprudence and introduces a large measure
of unpredictability in a field where certainty is of the essence.

THE CASE
'Octroi' derives from the Latin root 'auctorizare', meaning to authorise; an
irony that will not be lost to readers as this story unfolds. It begins in August 1968
when a group of Bharat Forge officers hurried to their attorneys' office. They were
indignant at the state government's move to withdraw an octroi exemption enjoyed
by the company until then. Having tempted Bharat Forge to set up its forging plant
and office at Mundhwa in the P09na cantonment with the promise of a 10 year octroi
holiday, the authorities had gone back on their word before the decade was out. The
octroi burden was certain to upset financial projections and depress the company's
profits.
Delving into the records, the company's advocates discovered that the Poona
Municipal Corporation (PMC), which was demanding and collecting octroi had no
authority to do so. First, since the factory was located within the Poona cantonment
(not Poona city), it was only the Cantonment Board that had the power to levy octroi
under the Cantonments Act, 1924. The Board had not imposed octroi at the 1963
schedule of rates, which were the rates being applied to the goods imported by the
company. Although the PMC had adopted the 1963 octroi schedule, that in itself was
not enough since its jurisdiction was confined to Poona city. In the absence of a
Cantonment Board resolution, there was no imposition or levy of octroi at the 1963
rates in the cantonment. Second, mandatory procedures for imposing fresh taxes in
a cantonment, including the inviting of objections from the public and prior central
government sanction, were not complied with when imposing the 1963 octroi rates.
Third, the PMC had no authority to collect the octroi on behalf of the cantonment.
Both statutes governing the municipal bodies required a written contract empowering collection. Indeed, Rule 3 of the PMC Octroi Rules provitled that the octroi limits
of the PMC would extend beyond the city to the Poona cantonment only where a
statutory agreement was entered into between the PMC and the Board. Plainly, in
the absence of a statutory contract, the collection of octroi by the PMC was illegal.
In February 1969 the company petitioned the Bombay High Court for a writ
to strike down the illegal levy and collection of octroi by the PMC. The PMC and
the Board resisted the action but after a lengthy hearing in 1979, the High Court
upheld the company's contention. The court found that in the absence of any valid
imposition at the 1963 rates, the schedule that applied in the cantonment was the
previous lawful imposition notified in the Gazette in 1918. Bharat Forge was liable
to pay octroi at the far lower 1918 rates and not under the 1963 schedule.3
3

By the time the case was heard finally by the High Court the issue regarding the 10 year tax holiday
was decided in favour of the company in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Poona
Municipality v. Bijlee Products (India) Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 304. However, the fundamental issue
whether the 1963 rates could be applied to Bharat Forge remained open.
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In 1981, the PMC and the Board appealed to the Supreme Court. Fourteen
years later in March 1995, it reversed the High Court and foisted a 20 year tax burden
on Bharat Forge running into several crores of rupees. According to the Supreme
Court, even though there was no Cantonment Board resolution imposing octroi at
the 1963 rates; no statutory contract between the PMC and the Board in respect of
collection; and no compliance with the procedure for imposing fresh taxes under the
Cantonments Act, 1924; the levy and collection of octroi at the 1963 rates still was
backed by the authority of law. It is to this extraordinary judgment of the Supreme
Court that we next turn.
To support the tax imposed in 1963, the Supreme Court resurrected a defunct
general order issued in the previous century. On 12th March 1881, the Bombay
Government with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, levied
octroi duties in the Poona cantonment. The notification imposed:
Octroi duties at the rates for the time being leviable and in respect of the
several articles for the time being dutiable in the Municipality of Poona when
such articles are imported into the cantonment from any place situate without
the limits of the said Municipality.
The 1881 scheme was re-adopted with modification in 1883 and again in 1891.
In 1918, the scheme was abandoned. The Poona cantonment adopted and published
a schedule of its own octroi rates that were different from those in force in Poona
city. The new octroi rates, introduced after several months of deliberations between
the governments of India and Bombay and the cantonment authorities, were a part
of a new tax regime contained in four sequential notifications. The 1918 notifications
completely severed the link between the cantonment and the city with regard to the
earlier common octroi rates. Goods brought into the cantonment were now to be
taxed at the rates in the cantonment Schedule. As the Supreme Court held, the 1918
notifications repealed the 1881 common octroi levy in the city and the cantonment.
A NEW PATH CALLED DESUETUDE
To overcome the Poona cantonment's failure to adopt the 1963 PMC octroi
rates, its lawyers argued that the 1881 common octroi levy continued despite the 1918
notifications. They asked the court to disregard the 1918 octroi schedule, claiming
that it was never implemented by the cantonment administration. The executive
decision not to enforce the 1918 notification rendered it 'still born'. Supporting this
submission the PMC mentioned4 the doctrine of desuetude and referred to Francis
Bennion's text on Statutory Interpretation.5 Bennion, the only authority cited by the
PMC, says this under the heading 'Desuetude':
4

Supra n. 2.

5

F.A.R. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (1992).
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An enacUllent contained in an Act does not become inoperative through lack
of use or the passage of lime. This applies even though the enacUllent is
disobeyed over a long period, and not enforced. Once in force, it remains law
until repealed.6
He then elaborates:
Desuetude is a legal process by which, through disobedience and lack of
enforcement over a long period, a statute may lose its force without express
or implied repeal by Parliament. The doctrine of desuetude does not apply to
United Kingdom Acts. This is salutary, since otherwise an enquiry would be
needed before the subject could know whether or not an apparent Act bound
him. The idea that an Act need not be applied if it had never been enforced was
put forward in the fourteenth century, but was later rejected.?
Clearly, Francis Bennion would have given short shrift to the PMC thesis that
the 1918 statutory notifications could be disregarded due to non-implementation.
And so too, one might have thought, would an Indian court.
The Bennion view rejecting desuetude has a parallel in Indian administrative
law. The Supreme Court has consistently held that an executive decision or administrative practice cannot supersede or override a statutory rule or notification.s
Applying this principle, the court should have turned down the PMC plea. Instead,
it chose to pay lip service to Mahendra Lal laini, cautioning that "it would be
hazardous to allow an executive authority to obliterate a statutory notification" and
then proceeded to permit just that: Obliteration of the 1918 statutory notification
because Poona octroi officials since long had adopted a contrary practice.
What impressed to the Supreme Court was not the binding precedent in
Mahendra Lal laini nor the statement of law in Bennion's text nor even the wisdom
of his commentary, but a footnote to his text, which read:
Under Scots law the doctrine does apply to Acts of the Parliament of ScoLland.9
Encouraged by this footnote, the Justices launched on some research of their
own. The judgment quotes several passages on the doctrine of desuetude which ~ere
neither cited nor referred to at the Bar. After a lengthy discussion, the court said:

6

Ibid. at 211.

7

Ibid. at 212.

8

Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 se 1019, 1963 Supp (1) SeR 912; K.M.
Chikkaputtaswamy and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 1985 (3) see 387; State
of M.P. andAnotherv. Municipal Corporation. Indore, 1987 (Supp.) see 748; c.L. Verma v. State
of Madhya Pradesh and Another, 1989 (Supp.) 2 see 437.
Bennion, supra n. 5 at 212.

9
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Though in India the doctrine of desuetude does not appear to have been used
so far to hold that any statute has stood repealed because of this process, we
find no objection in principle to apply this doctrine to our statutes as well. This
is for the reason that a citizen should know whether, despite a statute having
been in disuse for long duration and instead a contrary practice being in use,
he is still required to act as per the 'dead letter'. We should think it would
advance the cause of justice to accept the application of doctrine of desuetude
in our country also. Our soil is ready to accept this principle; indeed, there is
need for its implantation, because persons residing in free India who have
assured fundamental rights including what has been stated in Art. 21, must be
protected from their being, say, prosecuted and punished for violation of a law
which has become 'dead letter'. A new path is, therefore, required to be laid
and trodden.
Treading this 'new path', the court found that since the 1918 statutory
notifications were not implemented by the city administrators, the 1918 notifications
stood 'quasily repealed' by the process known in Scotland as desuetude.
THE LAW IN SCOTLAND
The irony is - there is no such doctrine in Scotland. Desuetude in Scots Law
applies to ancient (pre-1707) statutes, which in spirit declare the general custom of
the time. When the community adopted a contrary custom over a long period of time,
the old statute lost the sanction of the community and was considered repealed by
desuetude. For instance, statutes that relate to the observance of Sundays as days of
rest and prayer and prohibiting other activities, have come up most frequently in
litigation. Bute v. MorelO was about keeping a shop open on Sundays and Brown v.
Magistrates of Edinburoughll pertained to running cinemas on Sundays. Summarizing the position in Scotland, Mr. Nimmo Smith Q.C., member of the Scottish Law
Commission says:
a)

The doctrine of desuetude applies only to Acts of the Scottish Parliament
enacted prior to the Treaty of Union in 1707. It does not apply to post1707 Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, even those which extend
only to Scotland.

b)

The doctrine is principally of historical and academic interest and it is
highly unlikely that it will ever be applied in future cases in Scotland.

c)

The doctrine applies to statutes affecting the personal conduct of individuals as members of the community where there has been a persistent
contrary custom of the community. It operates so as to excuse compliance
with the statute thus repealed and never to secure performance of an act.

10 (1870) 9 M. 180.
11 (1931) S.L.T. 456.
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d)

The doctrine has never been applied, nor by its nature could it ever apply,
to a statute regulating a public authority, to a statute relating to taxation
or similar exactions.

e)

The doctrine, being essentially destructive, could not operate so as to
repeal a statute which in turn repealed an earlier statute, let alone revive
the earlier statute.12

In the opinion of Mr. Nimmo Smith, "If a set of facts similar to those in the
[Bharat Forge] case came before the Scottish Court any argument that the Doctrine
of Desuetude was applicable would be rejected out of hand ... None of the features
in support of the application of the doctrine would be present and indeed the opposite
is the case."
Emphasizing the historical basis of the doctrine of desuetude, Prof. Maher of
the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, says:
It is little appreciated that desuetude in Scots law has its rationale solely in
terms of the nature and function of a style of statute law which has long
disappeared. Up until the 15th and 16th Centuries the primary source of law
was the established practices, or 'custom', of the community. Statutes were not
perceived as a method of creating new law. Rather the function of statutes was
that of expressing, or restating, custom but statutes did not attempt to alter
community custom in any fundamental way
If community practice was in
a form directly contrary to that stated in a statute it followed that the statute
had wrongly described what that practice was. On this basis such a statute had
failed in its purpose and, therefore, failed to count as law.
"During the 17th and 18th Centuries the role of statute as a source of law
changed into something akin to its modern purpose. Statutes were now
regarded as expressing the will of their enacting body or person; they were
intended to create new law rather than to reflect existing community practice.
On this view of the role of statutes, there was no scope for any doctrine of
desuetude because contrary community practice did not indicate any 'failure'
in the purpose of the statute .... It is accordingly anachronistic in the extreme
to apply a principle such as Scots doctrine of desuetude to modern statutes
which have a quite different function from the old Scottish statutes. It is only
in relation to those old style of statute that desuetude in Scots law has its
historical rationale.l3
.
Mr. Nimmo Smith and Prof. Maher are categorical in their views. The Supreme
Court completely misunderstood and misapplied the Scots law doctrine of desuetude.
12 The expert opinions of Mr. Nimmo Smith and Prof. Maher on Scots law were filed by Bharat Forge
in the Supreme Court along with its review petition. This was the first opportunity the company
had for explaining the true scope and meaning of the doctrine.
13 Id.
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A Scottish judge would never apply the doctrine to a modem taxing statute. The
Supreme Court nevertheless did, giving its own meaning to the term, "desuetude".
There is perhaps one authority that might justify this method of construction.
"There is glory for you", said Humpty Dumpty.
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory' ", Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't - till I tell you.
I meant, 'there's anice knock-down argument for you!' "
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument' " Alice objected.
"When I use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."14

REVIEW: THE UNKINDEST CUT
But there is far more to this case than Humpty Dumpty jurisprudence. Bharat
Forge in its review petition urged the Supreme Court to reconsider the matter in light
of the expert opinions. of Mr. Nimmo Smith and Prof. Maher. Here was an
opportunity to correct the misstatement of Scots Law and the grave injustice in
retrospectively applying a misstated principle. The Court, however, was not impressed. The judges claimed "even if the aforesaid opinions be correct, in our
judgment the applicability of doctrine of desuetude is not founded on Scottish law ...
as we accepted the application of this doctrine keeping in view Art. 21 of the
Constitution also, the type of which provision is not known to Scottish law" .15This
is the unkindest cut of all.
No issue of Art. 21 arose in the case. None was raised in the pleadings, oral
arguments or written submissions. Not once during the hearing was there any
mention of Art. 21 from the Bench or by counsel for the parties. Important as these
factors are, they pale in the face of the real issues: How can a court entrusted under
the Constitution to protect the fundamental right to life and liberty, turn around Art
21 to foist a tax liability on an Indian company? Is Art. 21 meant to shield an illegal
impost by the state? Should Art. 21, the citizen's bulwark against State lawlessness,

14 L. Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, quoted by Lord Atkin in liversidge v. Anderson, (1942)
AC 206 at 245.
15 The full text of the order dated 3rd May, 1995, dismissing

the review petition reads:

"I. We have perused the petitions for review; so also the considered opinions of two expert
lawyers of Scotland, according to whom if a case of the present nature would come before
Scottish Courts, the argument that the doctrine of desuetude was applicable "would be
rejected out of hand", as put by Mr. WAN. Smith, Q.C.
2.

Even if the aforesaid opinions be correct, in our judgment on applicability of doctrine of
desuetude is not founded on Scottish law, as would be apparent from what has been stated
in paragraphs 31 to 33 of the judgment; and as we accepted the application of this doctrine
keeping in view Art. 21 of the Constitution also, the type of which provision is not known
to Scottish law, we reject the review petitions."
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be used to permit tax collectors to garner revenue in excess of notified rates? There
is little to commend in the approach of the Bharat Forge court and much to condemn
in it. The judgment deserves to be quickly overruled or, at the very least, distinguished to death.
OVERLOOKING

STATUTES

Quite apart from the 'desuetude' theory, the Supreme Court's reasoning is
seriously flawed. Assume desuetude was correctly applied by the court and that by
ajudicial sleight of the hand, the Poona Cantonment's 1918 schedule of rates fell by
the wayside due to quasi-repeal. By itself, this would not revive the 1881 scheme
which introduced the joint levy of octroi in the cantonment and the city. This is
because the 1918 notifications repealed the 1881 notification and the joint levy
scheme, therefore, stood effaced as soon as the 1918 notifications came into force.
Sections 6 and 7 of the General Clauses Act of 1897 provide that the repeal of a law
will not revive an older law which was not in force at the time of repeal. By holding
that the 1881 scheme "held the field" upon the quasi-repeal of the 1918 notifications,
the Supreme Court went against the express provisions of the General Clauses Act.
There is no discussion on the General Clauses Act in the main judgment or in the
order dismissing the review petitions.
One of the principal arguments urged by the company was that the PMC had
no power to collect octroi on behalf of the Cantonment Board because Rule 3 of the
PMC octroi Rules defined the octroi limits as the limits of Poona city. The rule
mandates that a statutory contract must be executed between the PMC and the
cantonment authorities, if collections are to be made by the PMC on behalf of the
Board. No such statutory contract existed, supporting the company's stand. The
court, however, side-stepped the company's objection by not dealing with it at all.
THE MISREADING

OF PRECEDENT

The Supreme Court's treatment of binding precedent in the Bharat Forge case
requires close examination. Many judgments were cited at the Bar, but most
remarkable is the Court's treatment of two of its previous decisions: Dhrangadhra
Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Gujarat16 and Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v.
Janapada SabhaP Citing these authorities, the company urged the Supreme Court
to invalidate the demands raised by the PMC since the statutory procedure under the
Cantonments Act was not followed before imposing octroi at the enhanced rates
prescribed in the 1963 schedule. Both judgments hold that the procedure prescribed
under the governing statute must be strictly followed when increasing a tax and any
infirmity in complying with the procedure would render the levy invalid.

16 (1973) 2 SCC 345.
17 (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 172.
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Dealing with Dhrangadhra Chemical Works, the Bharat Forge court twice
recorded that this judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench of the Supreme
Court. This is incorrect, and the case report shows that three judges, namely, A.N.
Ray, I.D. Duaand K.K. Mathew, 11. constituted the bench which decided the matter.
The Dhrangadhra decision was binding on the Bharat Forge court which also
comprised of three judges. The Bharat Forge court distinguished the judgment on
the ground that in Dhrangadhra "the Municipality's increase of octroi was its first
act" unlike the situation in the 1Jharat Forge case, wbere octroi bad already been
imposed and the rate was merely being increased. Plainly, this ground for distinguishing Dhrangadhra Chemical Works is wrong. Tbe Dhrangadhra judgment is
short and crisp, covering less than 8 pages. In it, on no less than six occasions the
judges mention that the impugned levy was not a first imposition (as incorrectly
stated by the Bharat Forge court) but was an enhancement by 50 per cent of the
prevailing octroi rates. Consider these excerpts from the judgment: (a) "the Municipality bad further increasea the octroi by 50 per cent with effect from July 1, 1953" .
(para 2); (b) "The appellant had raised three .contentions before the High Court,
namely, .... that the enhancement of octroi by 50 per cent from July 1, 1953, was
illegal" (para 3); (c) "Tbe Municipality has no power under the Rules to alter the
Rules imposing the levy so as to enhance it. Tbe Higb Court was also of the view
that the Municipality bad no power to impose or enhance the rate of octroi under
the Rules" (para 6); (d) "This would seem to indicate that the Municipality purported
to enhance the octroi under the Rules as octroi had already been levied under the
Rules" (para 7); (e) "No objection was invited to the rules as required. Thereafter
the proposal to impose octroi at the enhanced rate was finalized." (para 11); (f) "Tbe
Appellant can take just exception only to the extent of one-third of the amount sbown
in the demand notice as that alone represents the 50 per cent increase. In the result,
we quash the demand notice to the extent of the 50 per cent increase" (para 18).
Clearly, the impugned increase of octroi in Dhrangadhra was not the
Municipality's first act. So much for the Supreme Court's reasoning in distinguishing Dhrangadhra.
Tbe Supreme Court used the same means for distinguisbing the constitution
bench judgment in Amalgamated Coalfields. Here again, on the court's reading of
the precedent, if found that the constitution bencb was not dealing with an increase
in the rates of an existing tax but was dealing with a nrst imposition of a tax. Yet
again, the reasoning bolds no water. At several places in the Amalgamated Coalfields
judgment the constitution bencb clearly records that the impugned levy pertained to
an increase in the rate of the coal tax from the original 3 pies per ton to 9 pies per
ton. In the discussion at pages 193-195 of the Supreme Court Reports, the court
repelled the Janapada Sabba's contention that the statutory taxing procedure need be
followed only for the nrst imposition, and held that every increase in the rate of tax,
including the impugned enhancement, would amount to a fresh imposition requiring
the statutory procedure to be strictly followed. The constitution bench struck down
the increased levy and held that the government was entitled to collect tax at the old
rate of 3 pies per ton. The Amalgamated Coalfields court concluded that if the
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Janapada Sabha "intends to increase the rate of tax it must follow the procedure
prescribed ...•" - the very argument urged by Bharat Forge.
Nothing in Dhrangadhra Chemical Works and Amalgamated Coalfields supports the Supreme Court' s strained attempts at distinguishing these binding precedents
by attributing 'facts' to those cases that were contrary to those recorded in the
judgments themselves. This casual treatment of precedent by the Supreme Court is
unconvincing. Indeed. the manner in which the Bharat Forge court went about its
business casts a shadow across the rule of law.

RULE OF LAW
The rule of law is fundamental to our constitutional scheme of governance. and
one of its basic tenets is the principle of legal certainty. This is the doctrine that laws.
should be prospective, open and clear so that every citizen may foresee the legal
consequences of his or her actions. Now consider what the Bharat Forge court did
in its anxiety to validate the impost. It clutched at an alien doctrine from Scotland
which was neither pleaded nor orally argued. It acknowledged that the doctrine had
never before been applied in India. but nevertheless applied it retrospectively to
Bharat Forge. foisting a.tax liability running into several million rupees. It justified
the impugned levy on an understanding of Scots law which was completely incorrect.
After the hearings concluded and without putting any questions to counsel on the
point. the judges did personal research to invent their own 'desuetude' theory. When
confronted with the experfScots Law opinions on review. the court backtracked and
justified its decision on the basis of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed under Art. 21 of the constitution. although Art. 21 was never urged and
never arose for consideration in the case. It used Art. 21 to foist a liability running
into tens of crores of rupees on an Indian taxpayer after assuming that Scots law
would not uphold such a levy. It declined to vigorously apply the settled principle
of Indian administrative law which prevents an administrative decision from overriding or superseding a statutory notification. It casually discarded binding precedent&
by attributing alien 'facts' to those cases. The black letter provisions in the PMC
Octroi Rules as well as the General Clauses Act were ignored. although arguments
were urged by counsel at the hearing.
It is difficult to reconcile such ajudgment with the principle of legal certainty.
which is embedded in the rule of law. Indeed. if these are to be the principles applied
to clothe judgments of the court; the day is not far when what the boy said about the
Emperor's new clothes, will be said of our Supreme Court.

